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Interdependence Between Social Values
and National Performance Indicators:
The Case of the Enlarged
European Union
Cene Bavec
Based on the desk research, the paper provides an empirical insight
into correlations between some social values and five selected economic
performance indicators for 20 European Union countries. We concen-
trated on Composite Trust. This is a one-dimensional representation
of citizens’ trust on national level and is calculated from three diﬀerent
types of trust that van Oorschot and Arts (2005) derived from the Eu-
ropean Values Study (2001). We confirmed correlations between trust
and economic performance, but we have also noticed a very diﬀerent
pattern for the old and the new eumember states. The old eumember
states show a positive correlation, on the other hand there is no such
correlation for the new member states. A plausible hypothesis is that
the same level of Composite Trust causes diﬀerent eﬀects in diﬀerent
societies and economies. We could also assume that social structures in
the new eu member states are still distorted and are not in the equilib-
rium which characterizes eu countries with long democratic and mar-
ket economy traditions. Economic performance in the new eu mem-
ber states is based mainly on economic and not on social incentives. On
the other hand, correlation between trust and innovativeness is strong
in all studied countries. It confirms many studies which see trust as a
fundamental social enabler and stimulator for innovativeness.
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Introduction
Interactions and interdependences between economy and social struc-
tures and values attract many researchers from social and economic sci-
ences. It is a promising research area revealing social variables that in-
fluence economic development and vice versa. Transition to the Infor-
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mation Society and the New Economy has already disclosed many lim-
itations of the traditional view on economic performance, which is still
based mainly on macroeconomical and technological indicators. Our
first steps into the information society follow significant changes in so-
cial structures and values (Castells 2000) which consequently compli-
cate interplay between social structures and economy. We can also notice
uncertainty among researchers and practitioners about the relevance of
some macroeconomic and particularly technological indicators in new
economic environments. There is an evident lack of ‘softer’ indicators,
which would reveal development forces based on social structures, sys-
tem of values, and other societal characteristics.
Researchers agree that social structures influence economic develop-
ment (Sabatini 2006), for example creating a healthier atmosphere for
innovativeness, readiness to take business risks, and a better educational
system. On the other hand, we can very rarely find these indicators in
oﬃcial national statistics or even in government development policies.
This issue is still an academic aﬀair with a minimal influence on a wider
public perception of national performance and economic development.
Nevertheless, the European Commission has stimulated some interest-
ing researches on the eu level (European Trend Chart on Innovation
and Special Eurobarometers), which give an insight into national and
regional characteristics.
In this paper, we present a research that focused on correlation be-
tween Composite Trust and five macroeconomic indicators in the en-
larged European Union. We also experimented with the Composite So-
cial Values Index, as an approximation for social capital. We gathered
data on national levels from diﬀerent eu and international information
sources and current researches (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005) and an-
alyzed behavior of these indicators. Putting the ‘new’ eu25 economies
into the same context with the ‘old’ eu15 member states, we have re-
vealed some social and economic features that could be interesting for
other regions, too.
Some Current Researches
social capital
Social capital simplifies our perception and even substitutes a complex
concept of social structures and values. Many current researches are fo-
cusing on social capital and its interaction with the economy (Florida
and Tinagli 2004). The World Bank has even proclaimed social capital as
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a missing link in theories of economic development (Torsvik 2000). Re-
cently, Adam and Roncevic (2005) summarized debates and researches,
and concluded that social capital is important because it is a catalyst for
disseminating human and intellectual capital, it is a basis for greater lev-
els of synergy and coordination, it is a ‘lubricant’ of network organizations,
and it is a facilitator of intermediary institutions. This view is very com-
mon among social researchers.
Despite theoretical (Putnam 1993) and empirical (Hjerppe 2003; Fran-
cois and Zabojnik 2005; Sabatini 2006) evidences of its social and eco-
nomic relevance, we still lack an unambiguous definition of social cap-
ital. Torsvik (2000) argues that: First, the explanatory variables must be
clearly defined. Second, it must be specified how these variables interact in
the production process; the mechanisms that these variables work through
must be specified. The social capital idea falls short of both standards. As a
result, we measure social capital with indirect indicators. Sabatini (2006)
argues that indirect indicators may be misleading because they do not rep-
resent social capital’s key components and their use causes a considerable
confusion about what social capital is, as distinct from its outcomes, and
what the relationship between social capital and its outcomes may be.
Ambiguity and too descriptive definitions of social capital lead re-
searchers to empirically less convincing conclusions. Often, we are more
guessing at results than getting them objectively from empirical data. For
that reason, many researchers focus on simpler but less ambiguous social
indicators, such as trust or tolerance. These indicators cannot reveal all
the complexity of social capital, structures and relations, but they are at
least measurable and easier to interpret. In this paper, we follow this path
concentrating mainly on trust.
trust
As we already said, trust is not a replacement for social capital. It is just
one of social variables. Many authors see trust as an ingredient of the
social capital (van Schaik 2002). Sometimes, trust is even a synonym for
the social capital itself (Francois and Zabojnik 2005). On the other hand,
for Torsvik (2000) trust is a consequence of social capital. Trust has not
attracted such attention among researchers as social capital, but there are
many reasons that make trust an interesting social and even economic
issue.
What makes trust particularly relevant is its double role. It can be a
component of social capital, tolerance, or other social variables. How-
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ever, it can play a role on its own, as an independent social and eco-
nomic variable. Trust plays a crucial role in the contemporary manage-
ment and organizational theories and practice, particularly in virtual and
networked organizations that are becoming an organizational paradigm
of the 21st century (Mowshowitz 1997). Trust is an indispensable enabler
of virtual organizations and virtual management (Bavec 2005). Many
studies are dealing with the importance of trust in virtual teams (Keyzer-
man 2003; Coppola 2004) and in interorganizational networks forming
virtual organizations (Holland 1998). They confirm a rising relevance of
trust in the global and digitalized economy. Even common sense would
tell us that acceptable trust is cheaper than distrust in any business envi-
ronment.
Van Shaik (2002) assumed that interpersonal trust is unrelated to eco-
nomic growth at regional levels in Europe. Rimac and Stulhofer (2005)
discussed economic development as correlates of trust in the eu. For
them, trust is a motivator for cooperation and it lowers operational costs.
Their discussion was limited to qualitative arguments without empirical
evidence. Raiser (1999) argued that trust relates to economic growth only
in developedmarket economies, but not the case of the Central European
countries.
Many other studies deal with trust in an indirect way, as a part of
more general social indicators. Florida and Tinagli (2004) introduced
the 3ts (Technology, Talent and Tolerance) indicator and a single Euro-
Creativity Index. For them, tolerance stimulates openness to new peo-
ple and new ideas. An important part of the tolerance indicator is trust,
because distrust can paralyze society and makes it uncompetitive. How-
ever, we could argue that the concepts of social capital and tolerance are
partially overlapping and would have similar eﬀects on economic perfor-
mance.
Mihaylova (2004) published an extensive work on the Social Capital
in the Central and Eastern Europe and discussed the trust and economic
growth. The main concern of her research was the question: what is the
relationship between society and the economy? Her paper stayed on the
descriptive level, concentrating on sociological and political perspectives
with few empirical data. However, her work is important because she
tried to find a rationale behind diﬀerent social structures and economic
performance in the cee and other European countries.
Authors with sociological and not economic background conduct the
majority of current researches on social capital. This could be a reason
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that we see very little empirical evidence for otherwise plausible and con-
ceivable models of interaction between trust and other social values with
economic performance. This fact has even intensified our search for ad-
ditional empirical evidence to confirm these hypotheses.
In our research, we set up working hypotheses that follow common
understanding and perception of the relationship between social values
and national development performances. We started with the following
hypotheses:
1. Composite Trust will be positively correlated with economic per-
formance indicators for all eumember states.
2. The Composite Social Values Index will be also positively correlated
with economic performance indicators for all eumember states but
it would be less distinctive than Composite Trust, because of its too
simplified structure.
3. Correlations will be equal for both groups of countries – the old
eu15member states and for new eu25members.
4. Diﬀerences between old and new eu member states will a be result
of diﬀerences in economic development, only.
ResearchMethods
The primary goal of our research was to assess correlations or interde-
pendences of some social variables with economic performance in the
European Union. This is a wide geographical area with significant re-
gional and national diﬀerences in economic development and social val-
ues, which oﬀers an opportunity to test diﬀerent hypotheses. We were
particularly interested in any diﬀerences in behavior between old and
new eumember states.
Gathering any primary data on the national levels was far beyond our
research resources. For that reason, we conducted desk research looking
for in-depth relations between selected indicators, using secondary data
from public domain information sources and published researches:
1. The imdWorld Competitiveness Yearbook 2005;
2. The European Innovation Scoreboard 2005;
3. W. van Oorschot and W. Arts, The Social Capital of European Wel-
fare States: The Crowding out Hypothesis Revisited (2005);
4. L. C. J. M. Halman, The European Values Study: A Third Wave
(2001).
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Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) used primary data from the European
Values Study and introduced eight variables as multidimensional repre-
sentation of social capital. Three of them were dealing with trust (trust-
worthiness, trust in institutions, and interpersonal trust) and five with
other social values (passive participation, active participation, friends,
family, and political engagement). We used their individual data on the
country level to describe social values.
We simplified vanOorschot and Arts’ multidimensional view on social
capital, and introduced two one-dimensional variables:
• Composite Trust
• Composite Social Value Index
Composite Trust is a one-dimensional representation of citizens’ trust
on national level and was calculated from three diﬀerent types of trust
that van Oorschot and Arts (2005) derived from the European Values
Study. The idea was to represent trust as a single indicator that can be
used for assessing correlations with economic performance indicators.
Introduction of the Composite Social Value Index was purely experimen-
tal. Following the proposition of van Oorschot and Arts that all eight
selected indicators can be an approximation for social capital, we were
interested in whether it was positively correlated with economic perfor-
mance indicators, as predicted by other studies.
economic performance indicators
The imdWorld Competitiveness Yearbook 2005 was a source of individual
data on national level for competitiveness, business eﬃciency, economic
eﬃciency, and government eﬃciency (columns 4–7 in table 1). From
the European Innovation Scoreboard 2005 we obbtained the Summary
Innovation Index for selected countries (column 8 in table 1). This in-
dex gives an overview of an aggregate national innovation performance.
We should mention that not all individual indicators are referring to the
same year; they are spread over a period of four years. We could justify
this methodological inconsistency with the fact that social values and
economic performance indicators are changing relatively slowly over-
time, and they did not change significantly over the period of four years.
calculations of composite trust and the composite
social value index
We obbtained individual data on the national level from van Oorschot
and Arts (2005). We calculated Composite Trust as simply as possible.
Managing Global Transitions
Social Values and National Performance Indicators 219
Trustworthiness, trust in institutions, and interpersonal trust were nor-
malized on the average 1, and summed up with equal weighting applied
to all three indicators. The result is normalized again; so on average
Composite Trust in the selected countries is equal to 1 (column 2 in table
1). We also experimented with other social variables, calculating a Com-
posite Social Value Index (column 3 in table 1) in a similar way as Com-
posite Trust, using the following eight indicators (Van Oorschot and Arts
2005): trustworthiness, trust in institutions, interpersonal trust, passive
participation, active participation, friends, family, and political engage-
ment. The average Composite Social Value Index for selected countries
equals 1.
selected 20 eu member states
We were able to gather a full set of selected data only for 20 eu coun-
tries (column 1 in table 1), 14 old member states from the eu15 and 6
new member states from Central Europe and including Estonia. In the
research, we calculated correlations separately for old and new member
states, and for all 20 eu countries together.
Discussion of Results
In table 1, we collected individual data used in our research. We calcu-
lated Composite Trust (column 2) and the Composite Social Values In-
dex (column 3); other data are from primary sources, as described.
Table 2 shows correlation coeﬃcients between Composite Trust, the
Composite Social Value Index, and national performance indicators for
old and new member states, and for all 20 countries under discussion.
composite social value index
From table 2 we can conclude that the Composite Social Value Index
does not correlate significantly with all five performance indicators. We
could argue that correlation coeﬃcient 0.61 (business eﬃciency) and cor-
relation coeﬃcient 0.59 (competitiveness) indicate some correlation of
composite social values for old member states, but we did not explore
these relations further because correlations with trust were significantly
higher. However, it is interesting to point out that for newmember states
the correlation coeﬃcient is much lower. As we will see later in discussion
of the results, these significantly lower correlations indicate diﬀerences
in behavior patterns in old and new member states. The results also re-
jected our second hypothesis, i.e. that the Composite Social Values Index
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table 1 Individual data at the country level eu
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Old member states
Austria 1.03 1.02 74.3 68.9 50.8 58.9 0.51
Belgium 0.98 1.09 67.5 51.3 54.1 41.9 0.50
Denmark 1.17 1.11 82.5 77.1 47.0 74.3 0.60
Finland 1.11 1.06 82.6 75.7 46.1 75.9 0.68
France 0.95 0.92 64.2 37.5 58.9 38.6 0.46
Germany 1.02 0.97 67.8 44.7 52.5 45.9 0.58
Greece 0.86 1.08 50.3 31.1 40.2 31.1 0.21
Ireland 1.03 1.02 77.8 73.4 61.8 68.9 0.42
Italy 0.99 0.93 45.8 21.6 44.2 18.1 0.36
Netherlands 1.09 1.39 77.4 67.9 58.4 56.2 0.48
Portugal 0.94 0.82 52.4 25.1 42.4 42.2 0.28
Spain 1.02 0.89 59.4 34.3 50.8 47.8 0.30
Sweden 1.12 1.36 76.3 67.6 49.2 57.9 0.72
United Kingdom 1.00 0.98 68.5 51.0 56.5 51.0 0.48
New member states
Czech Republic 0.94 0.93 60.1 47.7 45.2 40.3 0.26
Estonia 0.93 0.84 66.7 49.3 54.4 65.3 0.32
Hungary 0.95 0.81 59.9 47.4 39.8 44.8 0.31
Poland 0.98 0.82 39.0 11.5 35.5 21.2 0.23
Slovakia 0.93 1.03 58.6 44.1 33.8 61.4 0.21
Slovenia 0.96 0.95 49.3 21.8 43.3 33.3 0.32
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) eu country, (2) Composite Trust, (3) Com-
posite Social Values, (4) competitiveness, (5) business eﬃciency, (6) economic eﬃciency,
(7) government performance, (8) Summary Innovation Index.
sources European Values Study 2005; imd World Competitiveness Yearbook 2005; Eu-
ropean Innovation Scoreboard 2005; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005.
would be positively correlated with economic performances indicators
for all eu member states. Our guess is that the Composite Social Values
Index, as we calculated it, cannot be a realistic approximation for social
capital. The main reason that we experimented with this indicator in the
first place was just our curiosity to discover whether a simple composi-
tion of publicly available social values has any meaning as an indicator
on its own.
Managing Global Transitions
Social Values and National Performance Indicators 221
table 2 Correlation coeﬃcients for old and new eu25member states,
and for total of all states under discussion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Composite Trust
Old 0.81* 0.79* 0.18 0.77* 0.79*
New –0.93* –0.90* –0.41 –0.94* 0.07
All 0.72* 0.69* 0.33 0.58* 0.82*
Composite Social Values
Old 0.55* 0.61* 0.18 0.36 0.51*
New 0.11 –0.12 –0.28 0.29 –0.41
All 0.59* 0.61* 0.30 0.38 0.59*
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) eu member states, (2) competitiveness,
(3) business eﬃciency, (4) economic eﬃciency, (5) government eﬃciency, (6) Summary
Innovation Index. *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
composite trust
On the other hand, we can notice a significant correlation between Com-
posite Trust and performance indicators, with the exception of economic
eﬃciency. To gain a better insight into these correlations we graphically
visualized the results. Graphical presentations have revealed some very
distinguishing features.
The first three graphs (figures 1, 2, and 3) show the interdependence
between Composite Trust and competitiveness, business eﬃciency, and
government eﬃciency. We can see that Composite Trust in all new eu
member states is below the eu average and is nearly equal, regardless of
their economic performance. Ten years ago, Kolankiewicz (1996) argued
that in the Central European countries lower trust remains as a legacy
of socialism, in which generalized trust tended to be low. We could also
suspect that the lower lever of trust in the new eumember states reflects
their ‘historical experience’ with triple and often traumatic transition in
the last 10 to 15 years, which caused radical changes in their societies. We
have in mind political transition from the socialistic system, economic
transition to the market economy, and finally accession to the eu. All
together, the new eu member states are more distrustful than the old
member states, but this fact has no direct influence on their economic
performance.
All three graphs (figures 1, 2, and 3) reveal diﬀerent patterns in behav-
ior of the old and the new eumember states. Trend lines for both groups
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figure 1 Correlation between Composite Trust and competitiveness
old member states ( linear), new member states ( linear)
are nearly perpendicular to each other. We have some diﬃculties in in-
terpreting negative correlations for the new member states because we
cannot assess errors in primary data and consequently in the correlation
coeﬃcients. Trend lines are slightly inclined to the left side. We inter-
preted this anomaly as a statistical error in data and we assumed that
these lines are vertical to the x-axis and do not characterize any negative
correlations. They just show that in these countries the performance in-
dicators do not depend on Composite Trust, or vice versa. On the other
hand, a positive correlation between Composite Trust and performance
indicators is evident for all old eumember states.
The trend-line for the old member states, in figure 1, shows that higher
trust means higher competitiveness. The correlation coeﬃcient 0.81 is
high. On the other hand, the trend-lines for the new eu member states
are nearly vertical, whichmeans that competitiveness, business, and gov-
ernment eﬃciency do not depend on Composite Trust. Correlations for
the old member states are high enough to be statistically significant.
This Result leads to the conclusion that the eﬀect of trust is not equal
in the old and newmember states. A plausible hypothesis is that the same
level of Composite Trust has diﬀerent eﬀects in diﬀerent societies and
economies. We will see the same behavior in figures 2 and 3. Obviously,
other development forces compensate for the lack of trust in the case of
new eumember states. These results also to some extent confirm Raiser’s
(1999) observation that trust relates to the economy in developed market
economies, but not in the Central European countries.
A positive correlation between trust and business eﬃciency (figure 2)
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figure 2 Correlation between Composite Trust and business eﬃciency
old member states ( linear), new member states ( linear)
looks straightforward. By the definition of business eﬃciency (imd
World Competitiveness Yearbook 2005) it is an extent to which enterprises
are performing in an innovative, profitable and responsible manner includ-
ing productivity and eﬃciency, labor market, finance, management prac-
tices and attitudes and values. Estonia is on the top and Poland is on the
bottom of business eﬃciency in the Central European and Baltic region,
regardless of their nearly equal level of trust. Looking for the forces that
compensate for a lack of trust, we can assume that Estonia introduced
more eﬃcient development incentives than Poland.
A similar situation is seen in figure 3. Government performance (imd
World Competitiveness Yearbook 2005) is an extent to which government
policies are conducive to competitiveness: public finance, fiscal policy, in-
stitutional framework, business legislation and societal framework. Again,
Estonia and Slovakia are on the top and Poland on the bottom. Portugal,
for example, is falling behind all eu member states. We can also notice
large diﬀerences in government eﬃciency in new member states, which
are independent from the level of trust. Government eﬃciency depends
on a wide spectrum of issues, from economic to historic (Bavec 2006),
but it seems that social issues are lower on the influence list than others
are.
In figure 4, we can see a very diﬀerent pattern. We notice a significant
correlation between Composite Trust and the Summary Innovation In-
dex (correlation coeﬃcient 0.82). In the contrast to figures 1, 2, and 3, the
old and the new eumember states follow a similar trend line. This result
confirms researches that placed the trust at the center of social values
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figure 3 Correlation between Composite Trust and Government Eﬃciency
old member states ( linear), new member states ( linear)
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figure 4 Correlation between Summary Composite Trust
and the Summary Innovation Index
old member states ( linear), new member states ( linear)
relevant for human innovativeness (Florida and Tinagli 2004). Scandi-
navian countries have the highest Composite Trust (table 1). In general,
high social capital and consequently high levels of trust are trademarks of
innovative societies. Researches in other regions, for example Singapore
(Keong 2006), have empirically confirmed similar conclusions.
What is particularly worrying for the new eu member states is their
significantly lower level of innovativeness. We will not argue about the
reasons. What our research shows is just the fact that the low level of
trust is associated with low innovativeness, and vice versa. This means
that we cannot stimulate innovativeness just with economic incentives.
We are supposed to introduce social changes, too. On the other hand, we
know that social values and structures are changing very slowly, which
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figure 5 Correlation between Composite Trust and National Economic Performance
old member states ( linear), new member states ( linear)
leads to the plausible conclusion that positive changes in innovativeness
are slower than economic changes. This could explain the decade long
struggle of new eumember states to raise their innovativeness, with very
slow improvements. New eumember states still compensate for the im-
pact of lower innovativeness to their economies with a higher level of
direct foreign investments and import of new technologies.
The figure 5 shows an unexpected result. Composite Trust is not cor-
related with economic performance for all 20 selected eu countries (cor-
relation coeﬃcient 0.33). Correlation with the Composite Social Value
Index is even lower (correlation coeﬃcient 0.30). This result is interest-
ing because it has triggered somemethodological warnings related to our
desktop research. We are not in position to assess correctness of thep-
rimary data and we have to take them as accurate. In the case of the
Economic Performance indicator published in the imd World Competi-
tiveness Yearbook 2005, we have some reservations about its correctness.
Looking at other economic indicators it is hard to justify the economic
performance indicators for Slovenia 21.8 and Italy 21.6 on the one hand,
and Slovakia 44.1 and Estonia 49.3 on the other.
Our opinion is that correlation between Composite Trust and eco-
nomic performance should be more significant in the case of data that
are more realistic. This would also back up Raiser’s (1999) view about the
character of trust in national economies.
Conclusions
The ambition of this paper is to present some empirical evidence and
not to provide a detailed explanation of the present situation. For that
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reason, we can just briefly comment on our working hypothesis. Sur-
prisingly, the hypothesis that Composite Trust will be positively corre-
lated with national performances indicators was confirmed only for the
old eu member states and not for the new ones. The hypothesis that
correlations will be alike for the old and the new eu member states was
confirmed only for correlation of Composite Trust and the Summary In-
novation Index (sii).
We do not have enough empirical evidence to make decisive conclu-
sions, but our research leads to some plausible suggestions. One of them
is that trust and other social variables do not have the same eﬀects in
all countries. The old eu member states represent relatively stable so-
cial structures and values in comparison with the new member states.
The most developed North European countries like Denmark, Sweden,
Finland, and the Netherlands have significantly higher Composite Trust
than others. Greece and Portugal are on the other side, with the lowest
Composite Trust. However, they do show a positive correlation between
trust and their performance. There is no such interdependence in the
new eu member states. At first, they all represent a distinguishable clus-
ter, with Composite Trust lower than the eu average. We could presume
that social structures in the new eu member states are still distorted
and are not in the equilibrium which characterizes developed countries
with long democratic and market economy traditions (Mihaylova 2004;
Kolankiewicz 1996). Nevertheless, the new eu member states are eco-
nomically and socially successful, despite some deficiency in their social
capital. This indicates another stimulus for economic development and
opens up a dilemma if higher social capital is primarily a result of eco-
nomic development, or vice versa.
The Summary Innovation Index (sii) is the only one of five perfor-
mance indicators that shows a diﬀerent pattern. It is strongly correlated
with Composite Trust for all countries studied. This confirmsmany stud-
ies, which see trust as a fundamental social enabler and stimulator for in-
novativeness (Rimac and Stulhofer 2005; Florida and Tinagli 2004). This
fact could have significant consequences for the new eu member states,
because they all face low national innovativeness. If innovativeness fol-
lows the same time-resistance as social structures, then it will be diﬃcult
for them to make ‘big leaps’ in innovativeness that are often seen in their
economic performance. It is not a surprise that their national innovation
policies reflect frustration with slow progress in this field. On the other
hand, it is very indicative that there are nearly no references to social
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values in their innovation policies. Understanding of social incentives in
national innovation policies is obviously very low.
The results support the view (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005) that we
have to adopt a ‘multi-dimensional’ interpretation of trust and other so-
cial variables as social capital. They used an eight-dimensional indicator
for social value, which proved to be diﬃcult to manipulate and interpret.
On the other hand, our oversimplified approach – when we transformed
their 8-folded indicator into a single number-proved to be inappropriate.
Behavior of this one-dimensional social indicator was not even close to
the behavior that we would expect from the social capital. Amultidimen-
sional view would complicate our models and interpretation of results,
but it is the only way to gain a deeper insight into the complicated in-
terplay between social values and economy in general. The multidimen-
sional model of social capital and its interactions with economy deserves
further researchers’ attention.
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